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Resumo
Esse artigo estuda a autosseleção dos emigrantes retornados no Brasil,
de 2001 a 2010. Verificou-se empiricamente o impacto da desigualdade
de renda na autosseleção através de dois canais opostos. Em primeiro lu-
gar, os custos de migração impedem indivíduos com baixa qualificação
de emigrar, o que contribui para a seleção positiva. Essa seleção é acen-
tuada em locais com muita desigualdade. Em segundo lugar, indivíduos
com baixa qualificação têm incentivos salariais para emigrar de estados
mais desiguais, o que contribui para a seleção negativa. Considerando os
dois canais, os efeitos dos custos de emigração são mais importantes, com
predominância da seleção positiva.
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Abstract
This paper investigates self-selection of returnees migrants in Brazil,
from 2001 to 2010. We find evidence of the impact of inequality on self-
selection through two opposing channels. First, migrations costs prevent
low-skilled individuals from emigrating, which support positive selection.
This selection is accentuated in locations with high inequality. Secondly,
we find that low-skilled individuals have wage incentives to emigrate
from states with relative high inequality, implying a negative impact on
selection. All in all, we find more important effects of migration costs,
with the predominance of positive selection.
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1 Introduction
Several studies indicate that migration from developing to developed coun-
tries tend to be relatively qualified, in relation to the individuals in the origin
country. This phenomena may be harmful and prevent developing countries
from keeping human capital, a fundamental input of economic development
(Mankiw et al. 1992) and an essential factor to devise and develop new tech-
nologies (Romer 1990).1
The recent crisis in developed countries, combined with stabilization and
growth in Brazil, has progressively attracted not only foreign migrants, but
also Brazilian returnees.2 The flows of Brazilian returnees had a three-fold in-
crease from 2005 to 2010.3 One could expect the return of human capital that
“drained” in the past, as well as the return of labor. Considering immigration
as an inflow of human capital, returnees have some advantages compared to
foreign immigrants. Firstly, they do not face bureaucratic, cultural, or linguis-
tic barriers in migrating back to Brazil. Secondly, their return migration does
not trigger, at first, negative attitudes in compatriots that remained in Brazil.4
Returnees are considered in this paper because they are paid at the same
prices of other Brazilians, allowing a direct comparison. We find evidence that
these migrants have more education and earn higher wages than Brazilians
who remained in the country. Since Brazil is one of themost unequal countries
worldwide, one would expect the opposite, that highly educated Brazilians
would remain in the country. Considering that they earn relative high salaries,
why do these individuals tend to migrate to other countries (and return some
time later)?
This article quantifies the self-selection of return migrants in Brazil from
2001 to 2010, and estimates the impact of the underlying theoretical mecha-
nisms of selection through inequality. Using microdata from the 2010 census,
this paper compares wages of native-returnees to those of non-migrant na-
tives in each Brazilian state, providing a direct wage comparison. The role of
inequality on the correlation between education and migration costs is a key
issue in our study.
We found evidence of the impact of inequality on self-selection through
two opposing channels. On one hand, migration costs prevent low-skilled
individuals from migrating, which supports positive selection. This selec-
tion is more elevated in Brazilian states with high inequality, because they
present high return to skills. On the other hand, low-skilled individuals have
incentives for migrating to countries with low inequality where, their wage
is higher, which supports negative selection. Both channels are empirically
verified, with a predominance of the former.
Borjas (1987) shows that migration from countries with relatively high in-
equality and high rates of return to schooling is negatively selected. This
theoretical implication is based on a simplified assumption: migration costs
are a constant proportion of individuals’ income, regardless of their educa-
1Nonetheless, recent studies point to positive network externalities. See Docquier &
Rapoport (2012) for a survey.
2Between 2001 and 2010, the inflow of returnees was 2.5 higher than the inflow of foreigners.
3See Figure 2.
4A stream of the literature (Facchini & Mayda 2009, Müller & Tai 2016) indicates that natives
can have negative opinions regarding immigration, either because they can represent a competi-
tion in the labor market or because foreigners impose a net cost on the redistribution system.
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tion level or wage. Without this hypothesis, migration costs would represent
larger proportions of low-skilled individuals’ wage, reducing their motiva-
tions to migrate (Chiswick 1999, Assunção & Carvalho 2013).
Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) consider variable time-equivalent costs corre-
lated with skills to be what theoretically underpins negative, intermediate
and positive selection, depending on the amount of costs and their correla-
tion with skills. Empirically, they find intermediate selection as they com-
pare wage densities of Mexican residents to counterfactual constructed wage
densities that would be obtained were Mexican immigrants in the US paid
accordingly to Mexican prices. This paper presents the advantage of direct
wage comparisons (without price heterogeneity) and also the possibility of
econometric examination of different theoretical arguments determining se-
lection, notably the implication of variable proportional costs on the liquidity
constraint. Although Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) justify intermediate selection
via variable time-equivalent costs, they did not empirically test this hypothe-
sis.
Belot & Hatton (2012) estimate the self-selection determinants for OECD’s
immigrants. They focus on the poverty constraint and propose that less edu-
cated individuals have higher time-equivalent migration costs if their source
country is poor. This approach is close to that applied to the second-step re-
gressions in this paper. Although our empirical results are similar, there is a
fundamental difference: we use inequality instead of poverty. The theoretical
model indicates that inequality determines selection, not poverty.
For instance, one can consider a very poor country where everybody is
poor. In this case, the poorest individuals cannot migrate, but selection is not
observed because richer individuals cannot migrate either. A country may be
poor or rich, but if the correlation between time-equivalent costs and skills is
low (otherwise stated, if the inequality is low), cost-based positive selection is
low.
In addition, differently from Belot & Hatton (2012), this paper makes use
of individual data, which allows us to investigate self-selection on observed
and unobserved characteristics by education level.
Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) extend Borjas (1987) return migration model,
arguing that there is a negative selection in the migration and a positive se-
lection in the return migration.5 It is important to note that the selection in
(the first) migration compares migrants to native non-migrants whereas the
selection in the return (second) migration compares migrants that are coming
back to those that remained in the destination country.
This paper compares returnee migrants to natives that have never mi-
grated. In the context of Borjas and Bratsberg’s model (with constant time-
equivalent costs), only the “first” selection counts, in this case returnees mi-
grants would be negatively selected. Once again, variable time-equivalent
costs would change these implications.6
5As migration to countries with relatively low return to skills is negatively selected, the first
individuals to migrate are those with the lowest skills (alternatively, individuals with the lowest
skill are those with the highest incentives to migrate). Eventually, a certain stock of immigrants
lives in the foreign country. When these immigrants decide to go back to their source country,
the move starts with the most skilled within the settled immigrants’ stock, or the latest to arrive
(alternatively, those persons that migrate from source to destination country, but with the lowest
incentives.)
6Education obtained in a foreigner country can not be controlled and may bias the results.
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The main contribution of this paper is to clarify migration self-selection
mechanisms based on migration costs and inequality. It is evident that the
brain drain caused by positive selection in unequal countries like Brazil, fre-
quently found in the literature, is largely explained by migration costs and
high levels of inequality.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 sketches
Borjas (1987) model and includes variable time-equivalent migration costs.
Section 3 presents the econometric specification. Section 4 details individual
data of return migration in Brazil from 2001 to 2010. Section 5 analyzes the
results of the empirical analysis, and finally section 6 presents our conclu-
sions.
2 Theory
2.1 Self-selection
Borjas (1987), based on Roy’s 1951 model, shows that migrants from coun-
tries with relatively high returns to skills and also high earning inequality are
negatively selected. A strong hypothesis for this result is that time-equivalent
migration costs are constants across all individuals. Therefore, low-skilled
individuals living in countries with high returns to skills tend to migrate to
more equalitarian countries where low-skilled individuals are not so penal-
ized with relative low wages.
Nevertheless, if time-equivalent migration costs are higher for low-skilled
individuals, those costs represent an obstacle for them. Chiquiar & Han-
son (2005) consider a negative correlation between time-equivalent costs and
skills,7 which underpins the intermediate selection for migrants fromMexico
to the US that they found.
Self-selection occurs twice in return migration; when the individual mi-
grates from home country to foreign country, and when she or he migrates
back. Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) indicates that if there is positive selection in
the first migration, there will be negative selection in the second migration.
Nevertheless, if one compares returned migrants with native non-immigrant
individuals, what determines their differences is the first selection. This ar-
ticle compares wages of Brazilian returned migrants with those native non-
immigrant individuals. This comparison is driven by the first selection, de-
spite the second selection.8
Figure 1 illustrates the self-selection on return migration. Considering the
“first” migration positively selected, the “second”, or return migration, would
be negatively selected. However, the latter, those individuals that “migrate
temporarily” are on average more educated than those individuals that “stay
in the source country”.
Following Borjas (1987), Borjas& Bronars (1991), Borjas & Bratsberg (1996),
wages w in Brazilian states i are distributed according to the mean log of
7See Chiquiar & Hanson (2005, pp.243) for examples justifying negative correlation between
time-equivalent costs and skills.
8For instance, if the first selection is positive, individuals in the foreign country are more
educated than those natives that remained in the home country. Immigrant that return, are in
average more educated than non-migrant natives, even if they among the least educated among
those migrants in the foreign country (even if the second selection is negative.
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Figure 1: Self-Selection of Return Migration
wages in each state µi , the return to skills σi and according to the individual
skill S:
ln(wi ) = µi +σiS (1)
If the population of the source location i (henceforth Brazilian state, for
the sake of clarity) migrated to destination country j , they would face the
following distribution of wages:
ln(wj ) = µj +σjS (2)
Considering time-equivalent migrations costs Cij ,9 an individual migrates
from state i to country j if migration index I is positive:
I = µj +σjS − µi −σiS −Cij (3)
Self-selection is then determined by its partial derivative on skills:
∂Iij
∂S
= σj −σi −
∂Cij
∂S
(4)
Borjas (1987) assumes that time-equivalent migration costs are constant
for all individuals, which eliminates the last term of equation (4). Chiquiar &
Hanson (2005) defend a more realistic view where these costs are constant in
“financial terms”, but time-equivalent costs vary according to the individual
income.
This hypothesis, on one hand, accentuates positive selection since migra-
tion costs represent a higher proportion of income (thus, a higher migration’
barrier) for least-skilled individuals. Even when the differential of return to
skill imposes a negative selection, migration costs aremore severe for the least-
skilled people, preventing them from migrating.
On the other hand, if one considers variable time-equivalent costs, hetero-
geneity in returns to skill has to be taken into account. The higher the return
to education, the higher the negative correlation between migration costs and
9Considering Fij as total migration costs, we considered that ln(wi +Fij ) ≈ ln(wi )+Cij , where
Cij are time-equivalent costs.
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skills, thus, leading to even more positive selection. Time-equivalent costs of
migration is a function of:10
Cij = f (Fij ,S,σi ) (5)
Instead of assuming or imposing very specific functional forms for time-
equivalent migration costs,11 we would rather have skills S interact with fi-
nancial costs Fij . Considering equation (6), if β3 is negative, migration costs
are the highest for those individuals with no education at all, and they pro-
gressively decrease according to the skill level.12
Cij = β0 + β1S + β2Fij + β3FijS (6)
This specification assumes that time-equivalent migration costs decrease
with skills in the same way everywhere. However, these costs may decrease
differently according to the return to skills within each location. Specification
(7) takes into account that migration costs represent different proportions of
a given individual’s income, according to the location’s return to skills (σi ).13
Cij = β0 + β1S + β2Fij + β3FijS + β4σiFijS (7)
The partial derivative of equation (7) on skills leads to:
∂Cij
∂S
= β1 + β3Fij + β4σiFij (8)
We expect that time-equivalent costs decreases with skills, therefore: β1 +
β3Fij + β4σiFij < 0 and that they decrease even more if the return to skills is
higher, then: β4 < 0.
The coefficient β1 captures the effect of migration costs that are constant
for any pair of state-country, we expect β1 < 0.
Replacing equation (8) in equation (4) leads to:
∂Iij
∂S
= σj −σi − β1 − β3Fij − β4σiFij (9)
Borjas (1987) considers only the σj−σi difference to explain the self-selection
of migrants. In the case of an unequal country such as Brazil, this difference is
predominantly negative and implies negative selection of Brazilian emigrants.
Where time-equivalent costs of migration is a function of skills and return to
skills, the selection equation would include other terms (−β1−β3Fij −β4σiFij ).
One can notice that even if the σj−σi difference has a negative impact on selec-
tion, the other terms have a positive effect on self-selection. The econometric
analysis shows that the latter prevails.
10Rate of return to skill in source locations is considered, asmigration costs are incurred before
the migration itself.
11E.g. Chiquiar & Hanson (2005, pp.243) consider the following form for time-equivalent
migration costs (noted as π): π = exp(µp − δpS), where µp and δp are constants.
12Interaction terms with higher order for skills “S”were tested and are readily available under
request. Nevertheless, they do not present significant effects.
13The rate of return to skills is interacted only with the interaction between Financial Costs
and Skills (coefficient β4). Other terms do not depend on this rate, for instance β3 quantifies the
effect of Financial Costs on Time-Equivalent costs for null skill level. In this case, it is meaningless
to consider the rate of return to skills, since skills are equal to zero.
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The inequality of origin location σi has two opposite impacts on self-selection.
Firstly, in line with Borjas, the impact is negative since it is equivalent to a
high return to education rate in the origin place (preventing highly educated
people from migrating). Secondly, it impacts self-selection positively because
high levels of inequality raise the correlation between time-equivalent costs
of migration and education. In the extreme case with very high levels of in-
equality, time-equivalent costs are huge for low educated people (preventing
them frommigrating) and tiny for highly educated people. The two opposing
impacts of the inequality of origin location on selection is given by equation
(10), as β4 < 0.
∂2Iij
∂S∂σi
= −1− β4Fij (10)
Therefore, Borjas’ specification would be affected by a missing variable
bias. In particular, if the magnitude of β4 is large enough, the biased coef-
ficient of the σj − σi difference would be even positive. This bias is indeed
verified in the econometric analysis.
3 Econometric Specification
3.1 Estimations of Self-Selection - First-Step Regressions
We followed Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) methodology. The term of selection
∂Iij
∂S
is defined for each Brazilian state i as the average log wage difference between
migrants from country j (Brazilian states’ natives that have already migrated
to country j and then returned to state i) and non-migrants (natives in state i
that have never migrated). Thus, a first-step regression is thus estimated for
each Brazilian state i:14
ln(wki ) =
n∑
j
δijD
k
ij + ζiX
k
i (11)
where Dij is a dummy indicating if individual k is a migrant returned from
country j to Brazilian state i. The coefficient δij gives, therefore, the migrant’s
log wage relative to natives. A vector of demographic controlsXki
15 is included
for the regressions of adjusted wages.
These first-step regressions are estimated for two cohorts: the first one
for those migrants that returned between 2001 and 2005, and the second one
for those migrants that returned between 2006 and 2010. This procedure
controls for wages’ differences related to the time of migration. Returnees
that migrated before 2005 had more time to reintegrate to their homeland
than those that migrated after 2005. Moreover, Brazil’s economical situation
changed over this period,16 and so did migration flows.
14Index i is not meaningful in regressions represented by equation (11), as they are run for
each state i; however, they are used because coefficients δij are going to be pooled from each
regression, in the second step.
15The controls are age, age squared, education level, marital status, health and metropolitan
residence.
16In average, the Brazilian GDP grew from 2.80% in the first period to 4.49% in the second
period. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of these flows between 2001 and 2010. The
average over the first period from 2001 to 2005 is about 7000 returnees while
the average over the second period is about 24000 returnees. According to Bor-
jas (1996, pp.173), larger amounts of migrants lead to a “more diluted quality
of the typical immigrant in a flow that is positively selected".17 Therefore, se-
lection is sharper in the first period than that in the second period, increasing
wage heterogeneity.
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This figure considers 24-64 year-old individuals that were born is
the state where they answered the 2010 Brazilian census. The total
is 153298 individuals.
Figure 2: Inflows of Returnees by Year
3.2 Proxies of Migration Costs and Return to Schooling
Migration costs are represented by three different variables: the distance be-
tween the Brazilian state and the country ofmigration (for diminishing marginal
effects, distance is also considered squared), common language, and contigu-
ity, which are dummy variables that equal to one if the Portuguese is spoken
in the country of migration, and if this country shares a border with the Brazil-
ian state, respectively.
Fij = λ1Distanceij +λ2Distance
2
ij +λ3Language +λ4Contiguity (12)
We expect that these costs are an increase function of distance: λ1 > 0,
λ2 < 0, and that it decreases with common language and contiguity: λ3 < 0
and λ4 < 0
We followed Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) and proxy for the rates of return
to skills using a measure of income inequality, the (quintile) ratio, henceforth
q:18
17Recalling that Borjas (1996) does not consider variable time-equivalent costs and then posi-
tive selection is due only to differences in the rates of return to skill.
18We use the ratio of the average income of the 20% richest individuals over the average in-
come of the 20% poorest individual. Doing so, this ratio is consistent with data used for the
inequality of migration countries, from UNDP (2011).
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qi = θσi (13)
3.3 Determinants of Self-Selection - Second Step Estimable Equations
The estimable equation of (9) is:
δij = α0 +α1(qj − qi ) +α2Distij +α3Dist
2
ij +α4Langij +α5Contij
+α6Distijσi +α7Dist
2
ijσi +α8Langijσi +α9Contijσi (14)
Where: α0 = −β1
α0 = −β1
The model predicts α0 > 0
α1 = θ
α1 > 0
α2 = −β3λ1 and α6 = −β4λ1 >
The model predicts α2Distij +α6Distijσi > 0 and α6 > 0
α3 = −β3λ2 and α7 = −β4λ2
The model predicts α3Dist
2
ij +α7Dist
2
ijσi < 0 and α7 < 0
α4 = −β3λ3 and α8 = −β4λ3
The model predicts α4Langij +α8Langijσi < 0 and α8 < 0
α5 = −β3λ4 and α9 = −β4λ4
The model predicts α5Contij +α9Contijσi < 0 and α9 < 0
The two opposing effects of the inequality of origin location on selection
given by equation 10 are estimated by equation (15) below. Besides the role of
inequality per se, given by −α1, one can notice that its interaction with factors
that reduce migration costs have a positive impact on self-selection, as α8 and
α9 are expected to be negative. Conversely, the interaction of inequality with
the factor that raises migration costs has a positive impact on self-selection, as
α6Distij +α7Dist
2
ij is expected to be positive
−α1 +α6Distij +α7Dist
2
ij +α8Langij +α9Contij (15)
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4 Data
The Brazilian 2010 census counted 204,374 returnees that came back to Brazil
from 2001 to 2010. In this study, we considered only individuals that returned
to the state where they were born,19 doing so prevents counting people that
are not returning, but migrating again. For example, we do not count as a re-
turnee the individual that migrated from Bahia to the US and then migrated
again to São Paulo. The self-selection of this individual is related to individu-
als in Bahia, not in São Paulo. As regressions are estimated by Brazilian states,
we compared only individuals born within each state. Table 1 details these
individuals by country of migration.
Table 1: Migration Country of Returnee Migrants
Country Returnees Perc. Country Returnees Perc.
Africa 1870 1.22% Asia 29369 19.16%
Angola 1077 0.70% Japan 27179 17.73%
Mozambique 167 0.11% China 570 0.37%
Namibia 102 0.07% Un. Arab Emirates 280 0.18%
Guinea-Bissau 92 0.06% Lebanon 271 0.18%
Equatorial Guinea 79 0.05% Israel 233 0.15%
Others 353 0.23% Others 836 0.55%
America 58739 38.32% Europe 58922 38.44%
United States 36058 23.52% Portugal 14617 9.54%
Paraguay 7561 4.93% United Kingdom 11579 7.55%
Bolivia 3095 2.02% Spain 9817 6.40%
Argentina 2947 1.92% Italy 8056 5.26%
Canada 2378 1.55% France 4278 2.79%
Uruguay 1273 0.83% Germany 3434 2.24%
Chile 1034 0.67% Switzerland 1912 1.25%
Mexico 882 0.58% Ireland 1641 1.07%
Peru 689 0.45% Netherlands 937 0.61%
French Guiana 525 0.34% Belgium and Lux. 842 0.55%
Others 2297 1.50% Austria 501 0.33%
Others 1308 0.85%
Pacific 2907 1.90%
Australia 2069 1.35%
New Zealand 838 0.55%
Notes: 1491 (1%) individuals out of this table answered “unknown” for migration
country.This table considers 24-64 year-old individuals that were born in the state
where they answered the 2010 Brazilian census. The total is 153298 individuals.
Rich countries are the top destination places for returnee migrants. The
U.S., Japan, Portugal, the U.K., Spain and Italy had been the choice for 70% of
returnees.20
Table 2 shows the distribution of return migrants in Brazilian states.21
Returnees are over-represented in the most developed Brazilian regions: the
Center-West has 9.54% ofmigrants, while the population’s share is 7.37%. The
South has 24.89% of the returnees and 14.36% of the population. The South-
east has 53.81% of the returnees and 42.13% of the population.
19Which reduced the volume to 153298 individuals.
20For comparison, foreignmigrants havemore dispersed origins, but proximity seems to count
more. Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay were the origin of 39% of foreign immi-
grants in Brazil, from 2001 to 2010.
21See figure 5 in section Appendix A to locate each Brazilian region in a map.
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Table 2: State of Origin of Returnee Migrants
State Returnees Perc. State Returnees Perc.
North 4591 2,99% Northeast 13440 8,77%
Pará 2008 1,31% Bahia 5119 3,34%
Rondônia 890 0,58% Pernambuco 2983 1,95%
Amazonas 760 0,50% Ceará 2224 1,45%
Amapá 341 0,22% Paraíba 961 0,63%
Tocantins 311 0,20% Maranhão 883 0,58%
Acre 141 0,09% Rio Grande do Norte 470 0,31%
Roraima 140 0,09% Alagoas 372 0,24%
Piauí 295 0,19%
Center-West 14626 9,54% Sergipe 133 0,09%
Goiás 8543 5,57%
Mato Grosso do Sul 3356 2,19% Southeast 82491 53,81%
Distrito Federal 1631 1,06% São Paulo - Metro 23142 15,10%
Mato Grosso 1096 0,71% Minas Gerais 22290 14,54%
São Paulo - Rest 21913 14,29%
South 38150 24,89% Rio de Janeiro 11600 7,57%
Paraná 22963 14,98% Espírito Santo 3546 2,31%
Rio Grande do Sul 8837 5,76%
Santa Catarina 6350 4,14%
Notes: This table considers 24-64 year-old individuals that were born in the state where
they answered the 2010 Brazilian census. The total is 153298 individuals.
Returnees are under-represented in the least developed regions: while the
North has 2.99% of returnees, it accounts for 8.33% of the Brazilian popula-
tion. The Northeast has 8.77% of returnees and 27.82% of the population.
Table 3 reports data on education level and gender of non-migrant natives
and returnees. Individuals that migrated are over-represented in categories of
higher education, as Tertiary Education and Secondary Education. Conversely,
they are under-represented in the other lower education categories: Primary
Education and No Education. The difference in the No Education category
is striking: while 43.3% of natives are in this category, this is the case for
only 16% of returnees. All in all, statistics on individuals’ education suggest
positive selection. In regards to gender, male returnees are over-represented
compared to those non-migrant male individuals. The percentage of men is
48% in the native (non-immigrant) population, while this percentage is 53%
in the returnee sample.
The measure of inequality used in the econometric analysis is based on
the quintile ratio.22 Data on countries’ inequality is obtained from the United
Nations Development Programme - UNDP (2011).23 Brazilian states’ quintile
ratio is calculated using census 2010 data. The average differences of coun-
tries’ quintile ratio and Brazilian states’ quintile ratio are mostly negative. In
90%24 of the cases that difference is negative, the average is −9.60.
Figure 3 shows the k-density of the wages of non-migrants and returnees.
Some locations25 were chosen due to their importance or specificity. Figure
22The quintile ratio is the proportion between the average income of the 20% richest individ-
uals over the average income of the 20% poorest individuals
23Data is available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/
hdr/human_developmentreport2011.html
24Considering 638 pairs of Country-Brazilian State in the largest samples of estimations, those
in table 4.
25See figure 5 in section Appendix A to locate each Brazilian state in a map.
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Table 3: Education Level and Gender
Returnees
Men Women Total
Individuals Perc. Individuals Perc. Individuals Perc.
No Education 14445 17,70% 10066 14,00% 24511 16,00%
Primary 11523 14,10% 8155 11,40% 19678 12,80%
Secondary 30079 36,90% 25624 35,70% 55703 36,30%
Tertiary 25276 31,00% 27743 38,60% 53019 34,60%
Unknown 190 0,20% 197 0,30% 387 0,30%
Natives (non-migrants)
Men Women Total
Ind. (000’s) Perc. Ind. (000’s) Perc. Ind. (000’s) Perc.
No Education 16900 45,70% 16300 41,10% 33200 43,30%
Primary 5995 16,20% 6138 15,50% 12133 15,80%
Secondary 10200 27,60% 11500 29,00% 21700 28,30%
Tertiary 3793 10,30% 5548 14,00% 9341 12,20%
Unknown 112 0,30% 135 0,30% 247 0,30%
Notes: This table considers 24-64 year-old individuals that were born in the state
where they answered the 2010 Brazilian census. The total is 153298 individuals.
3 (a) refers to the metropolitan area of São Paulo26, the biggest state in the
country, and figure 3 (b) refers to Rio de Janeiro, the second most important
economy in Brazil. Figure 3 (c) shows the wage distribution for Distrito Fed-
eral, the location with the highest average wage and the most unequal loca-
tion, while figure 3 (d) refers to Piauí, the state with the lowest average wage.
Figure 3 (e) shows data for Santa Catarina, the state with the highest equal-
ity, and figure 3 (f) shows the distribution of wages in Pernambuco, the state
presenting the highest average relative wages in the econometric analysis.27
One can notice in these figures that returnees are distributed at higher
wages than non-migrants natives, which suggests positive selection. This is
more evident for relatively poor states like Piauí and Pernambuco, and un-
equal locations like Distrito Federal than for large areas like São Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro28. Remarkably, the most egalitarian state in Brazil, Santa Cata-
rina, presents similar distribution ofwages, when returnees and non-migrants
are compared.
5 Results
5.1 First-Step Estimations
Equation (11) is regressed twice. First without demographic controls (vector
Xki ) estimating unadjusted relative wages, and then with demographic con-
trols estimating adjusted relative wages. While the former indicates selection
on observed and unobserved characteristics of migrants, the latter indicates
selection only on unobserved characteristics. We considered hourly wages for
26The state of São Paulo is broken down into two regions: the metropolitan area and the rest.
27The econometric section shows that returnee migrants residing in Pernambuco have Brazil’s
highest average wage, relative to natives. Figure 6 illustrates this finding.
28These regions are precisely the São Paulo metropolitan area and the state of Rio de Janeiro.
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Figure 3: Wages K-Density
all estimations.29
Two sets of first-step regressions are estimated. The first set regresses equa-
tion (11) 28 times for unadjusted wages: for each Brazilian state and Distrito
Federal.30 Each regression estimates the relative unadjusted wage (δij ) for an
average of 11.39 countries, which comprises 638 observations (11.39 countries
× 28 states × 2 cohorts = 638) for the second step. Figure 4 shows the distribu-
tion of these relative wages, and table 4 reports the results from second-step
estimations using them as a dependent variable.
The second set of regressions estimates equation (11) 28 times for adjusted
wages, resulting in 638 values of adjusted δij . Figure 5 shows the distribution
of these adjusted relative wages, and table 5 reports the results from second-
step estimations where they are the dependent variable.
We restricted the sample to male workers between 24 and 64 years who
were born in the state they reside (where they answered the census). The
gender restriction prevents any issue related to discrimination and mitigates
bias due to tied migration.31 Estimations are made twice, for two cohorts: one
for migrants that came back to Brazil before 2005 and another for those who
arrived after 2006.
29Hourly wages are obtained dividing the individual monthly salary earned in the principal
job by the quantity of hours worked.
30Brazil has 26 states, but the very large state of São Paulo is broken down into two regions:
the metropolitan area and the rest.
31Tied migration occurs when the decision of migrating considers the wage difference of the
family, and not the individual wage difference (Borjas and Bronars, 1991).
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We chose to regress at state level for two reasons. Firstly, we eliminated
geographical heterogeneities that could impact wages or migration choice. In
the sample studied, the average monthly wage in Distrito Federal is BRL2,545
(the highest in the country), while the average wage in Piauí is BRL545.00
(the lowest in the country). Amenities also differ between states. For instance,
average annual temperatures vary from 18.1◦ (in Santa Catarina) to 27.4◦ (in
Roraima).32
Secondly, we considered a returnee an individual that was born in a given
Brazilian state and returned to the same state, even if their current city of
residence is not their birthplace. By doing so, we did not discard from our
analysis the individual that came back to Brazil and does not live exactly in
the same city of birth, but on another city in the same state. In addition, we
did not consider the sequential migrant.
Estimations of unadjusted δij indicate that selection on observed and un-
observed skills is primarily positive. Indeed, return migrants earn higher
wages than nonmigrants in 80% of the observations.33 Figure 4 shows the
distribution of log-wage differences, the average is 0.79.34
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Figure 4: Histogram of Relative Log Wages
Estimations of adjusted relative wages indicate that selection on unob-
served is also primarily positive. Return migrants earn higher adjusted wages
than non-migrants in 68% of the observations. Figure 5 shows the distribu-
tion of wage differences. Relative adjusted wages present smaller values than
those of unadjusted wages. As observable characteristics such as education
and age are controlled, differences in migrants’ wages relative to natives’ are
reduced. The average wage is 0.33.
32Source: http://www.inmet.gov.br/portal/index.php?r=clima/
normaisClimatologicas
33Based on the table 4 sample with 638 observations, where each observation is a triplet state-
country-cohort.
34This finding does not verify the predictions of Assunção & Carvalho (2013), who expect
emigration of middle-class individuals from a country like Brazil, resulting in more equality
on their return to the country. Instead we find that returnees are positively selected. The Gini
index for the entire population is 0.52520, while the Gini index for non-migrant natives alone is
Self-Selection of Return Migrants in Brazil and Inequality 325
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
en
sit
y
−2 0 2 4 6
Relative Log Adj Wages
Figure 5: Histogram of Relative Log Adjusted Wages
Figure 6 shows the unadjusted relative average wage by Brazilian state35 .
The Northeast presents the highest wages, where returnees earn from 54% (in
Sergipe) to 174% (in Alagoas) higher wages than natives. This region seems
to receive the biggest benefits from return migration. Nevertheless, Table 2
indicates that returnees are under-represented in this region. One possible
explanation is that positive self-selection is stricter in this region and only the
very high-skilled individuals succeed in migrating. It is worth to note that
these values are much larger than those found in Borjas & Bronars (1991),
which may reflect the higher inequality in Brazil compared to the US.
1.75
1.27
1.07
0.89
0.8
0.58
0.47
0.17
-0.09
Figure 6: Average (by State) Immigrants’ Relative Log
Wages
Other Brazilian regions also receive a human capital increase, but to a
0.52455. The impact of return migration on inequality, if any, is positive.
35See figure 5 in section Appendix A to locate each state Brazilian in a map.
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lesser degree. On average, return migrants earn from −9% (in Roraima) to
104% (in Rio de Janeiro) across states of these regions.
5.2 Second-Step Estimations
As the dependent variable is a coefficient estimated in the first step, residu-
als are heteroscedas-tic.In order to correct this, second-step estimations are
obtained through a generalized least squares estimator.36
Unadjusted Wages
Table 4 shows the results for the estimable second-step equation (14) for un-
adjusted wages. Regression (1) estimates the returnee’s relative wage on the
inequalities’ difference qj − qi that indicates the difference of return to skills
between country of migration and Brazilian state. This regression would test
Borjas’ specification (1987, 1991, 1996), where time-equivalent costs do not
depend on skills. However, contrarily to the model’s prediction, the coeffi-
cient of qj −qi is not positive and highly significant. As expected, the omission
of migration time-equivalent costs may lead to a missing variable bias.
We estimated different specifications by taking into account migrations
costs. Firstly, we considered in columns (2) and (3) that time-equivalent costs
decrease with skills uniformly, in spite of differences in rates of return to skills
across Brazilian states. Secondly, we considered that differences in rates of re-
turn to skills may imply differences to the extent to which time-equivalent
costs decrease with skills: column (4) reports results for the complete equa-
tion (14).
Regression (2) estimates a positive effect of distance on migration selec-
tion, as predicted by the theoretical model.37 Brazilians that migrated to far-
off countries had to pay a high cost of migration. Low-skilled individuals,
regardless of the occasional possibility of higher wages, were less likely to be
able to afford such costs as these amounts represented large proportions of
these individuals’ income.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that, although this result confirms
the theory, the effect of distance on selection has an unexpected inverted U-
shape. The maximum positive effect of distance is 5438 km (which roughly
corresponds to Europe). The effects of distance decrease until the maximum
value reached by distance in the sample is 11,702 km.
Column (3) introduces other variables that are correlated to migration
costs. Common language is a dummy variable that equals to one if Portuguese
is one of the languages spoken in the migration country. Contiguity is a
dummy variable that equals to one if the Brazilian state and the migration
country have a common border. Both variables are negatively correlated with
migration costs, which reduces the amount of expenses an immigrant has to
pay. Therefore, these variables indicate a reduction in migration costs, allow-
ing low-skilled individuals to migrate and contributes to a negative selection.
Coefficients of both variables have, indeed, a negative sign, presenting a signif-
icant coefficient. The coefficient of qj − qi still remains negative in regressions
(2) and (3).
36See Borjas (1987) for details.
37The quadratic function of distance has roots 0 and 10.88 (thousands km). The maximum
value reached by distance is 11,702 thousands km.
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Table 4: Results: Unadjusted wages
Dependent Variable:
∆ of Ln (1) (2) (3) (4)
qj − qi −0.017
∗∗∗
−0.004
−0.014∗∗∗
−0.005
−0.012∗∗
−0.005
0.013∗
−0.007
Distance α2 0.174∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ −0.165∗∗
meters ∗103 −0,045 −0,051 −0,083
Distance2 α3 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ 0.021∗∗
meters ∗102 ∗ 106 −0.004 −0.004 −0.01
Common Language α4 −0.237∗∗
−0.12
−0.969∗∗
−0.44
Contiguity α5 −0.557∗∗∗
−0.209
−0.542
−0.542
Distance ∗qi α6 0.022∗∗
−0.005
Distance2 ∗qi α7 −0.002∗∗∗
−0,001
Common Language ∗qi α8 0.03
−0.022
Contiguity ∗qi α9 0.004
−0.027
Constant 0.668∗∗∗
−0,071
0.332∗∗∗
−0,127
0.543∗∗∗
−0,147
0.439∗∗∗
−0,146
Observations 638 638 638 638
R-squared 0 0.02 0.05 0.11
In column (4) we allow for differences in the return to skill and establish
differences in the correlation between time-equivalent costs and skills. We
took all costs variables considered in column (3). The difference in return to
skills between the Brazilian state and the country, qj−qi , presents the expected
positive sign predicted by the theory (which confirms Roy’s model) and it is
significant at a 10% significance level.
Interestingly, one can note that the shape of the distance’s effect on skill
changes according to the location’s inequality, but it is mostly strictly increas-
ing as the range of qi varies from 11 to 39.38 This result helps to elucidate the
apparent U-shape impact of distance on selection found in the previous re-
gression. We can see that, once the heterogeneity of inequality across locations
is considered, the impact of distance on migration selection is predominantly
strictly increasing.
The theoretical predictions regarding migration costs given by equation
10 and estimated according to equation 15, are completely found only for
distance in regression (4). The positive impact of distance on self-selection
is accentuated by the inequality level of the origin place. Regarding other
variables, only language presents a significant and negative coefficient in this
specification, although contiguity presents the expected negative sign.
Adjusted Wages
Table 5 reports results for adjusted wages in equation (14). A vector of demo-
graphic characteristics is included in the regressions of the first step (equation
38The variable qi varies from 11 to 39, with a mean equals to 18. At the lowest limit of qi , the
impact of distance on selection is described by 0.077Dist−0.001Dist2 , which is strictly increasing
in the interval. At the mean (18), the impact is 0.23Dist − 0.015Dist2 , which is increasing until
distance= 7.67 (thousands km), and includes 89.34% of the observations. Finally, at the highest
limit of qi , i.e. 39, we have 73.67% of the observations included in the interval where the impact
of distance on migration selection is increasing.
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Table 5: Results: Adjusted wages
Dependent Variable:
∆ of Ln (1) (2) (3) (4)
qj − qi −0.002
−0.004
0
−0.004
0.001
−0.004
0.012∗∗
−0.006
Distance α2 0.097∗∗∗ 0.081∗ −0.023
meters ∗103 −0.037 −0.042 −0.07
Distance2 α3 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ 0.004
meters ∗102 ∗ 106 −0.003 −0.003 −0.008
Common Language α4 −0.082
−0.1
−0.746∗∗
−0.373
Contiguity α5 −0.197
−0.175
−0.332
−0.46
Distance ∗qi α6 0.008∗∗
−0.004
Distance2 ∗qi α7 −0.001∗
0
Common Language ∗qi α8 0.031∗
−0.019
Contiguity ∗qi α9 0.009
−0.023
Constant 0.317∗∗∗
−0.059
0.118
−0.105
0.193
−0.123
0.149
−0.124
Observations 638 638 638 638
R-squared 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
Notes: Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All
regressions include a dummy for the 2001-2005 cohort. The
regressions use a generalized least squares estimator to correct the
heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable.
11). In line with Borjas & Bratsberg (1996), these characteristics are: age, age
squared, education level, marital status, health and metropolitan residence.
Regression (1) estimates the returnee’s relative adjusted wage on the in-
equalities’ difference qj − qi that indicates the difference of return to skills
between country of migration and Brazilian state. Unlike the results for un-
adjusted wages, qj − qi does not present a negative and significant coefficient
in any specification.
Columns (2) and (3) introduce variables that capturemigration costs, namely,
distance, common language and contiguity. Only distance presents a positive
and significant impact on selection.39
Similarly to estimations of unadjusted wages, regression (4) also confirms
theoretical predictions for non-observable characteristics. Inequality differ-
ences have a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that individuals
migrate to the place where their (non-observable) characteristics are valued
the most. Concerning time-equivalent costs, they are significant only when
interacting with the inequality ratio qi .
Theoretical predictions given by equation 10 and estimated according to
equation 15 are completely found only for distance, in column (4). It is sur-
prising that Common Language presents a positive and significant coefficient,
because the theoretical prediction is a positive coefficient.
Self-selection is, therefore, driven by migration costs and return to skills,
both observable and non-observable. More productive Brazilians migrate to
the countries that value workers’ high productivity the most.
39The quadratic function of distance has roots 0 and 10.13 (thousands km)in regression (3).
The maximum value reached by distance is 11.702 thousands km.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the self-selection of returnee migrants in Brazil from 2001
to 2010. As we compare the wages of returnees to those of non-migrant na-
tives, the observed selection occurred when these individuals migrated from
Brazil to a foreign country. Primarily positive selection is estimated using
individual data from the 2010 census.
This selection is explained by time-equivalent migration costs and inequal-
ity. Time-equivalent costs are higher for low-skilled individuals, as they spend
a longer period of time than high skilled individuals to amass the same in-
come. This period is still longer if the inequality is high. Alternatively, one
can think that low-skilled individuals face more difficulties with bureaucratic
requirements than high-skilled individuals. Yet, credit constraints may raise
migration costs for low-income individuals.
We find empiric evidence supporting the role of the correlation between
migration costs and skills determining positive selection. This selection is ac-
centuated in Brazilian locations with high inequality and high rates of return
to skill, as the correlation is higher.
The empiric analysis also confirms the predictions of Borjas (1987). Low-
skilled individuals have incentives to emigrate from Brazilian states with rel-
ative (to destination country) high inequality and high returns to skills, im-
plying a negative impact on selection. This impact is only verified once the
interaction between migration costs and inequality is controlled. In spite of
this partial negative effect on selection, migrations costs mechanisms prevail,
resulting in positive selection.
In Brazil, locations with high levels of inequality are the ones that suffer
the most with the brain drain. Consequently, they are the most benefited with
the increase of human capital when those emigrants returns.
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Figure A.1: Brazilian States and Regions
